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Social event knowledge is abstraction-derived from concrete experience of social life —
its content originates in human interaction and constructs the understanding of the social 
world. The social brain hypothesis links evolutionary pressure for brain enlargement and 
specialization to the need of solving problems in socially complex environments 
(Dunbar, 1998). This hypothesis (put forward originally by Jolly (1966) and Humphrey 
(1976)), and ultimately in fully fledged form as the “Machiavellian intelligence 
hypothesis” by Bryne and Whiten (1988) argues that the complex nature of our ancestors 
sociality, involving both the formation of intense social relationships and the use of 
coalitions in cooperative defense, imposed unusually heavy demands on their capacities 
to make inferences about the future behavior of other group members. The sophisticated 
neural architecture of the human prefrontal cortex (PFC) along with the sustained firing 
of its neurons (Fuster and Alexander, 1971) and the ability to integrate a larger amount 
of excitatory inputs from many sources (Elston, 2000) provided a vehicle for the 
emergence of social cognition (Adolphs, 2003). 
If brain size is driven by the demands of sociality, what kind of cognitive 
mechanisms can bridge the gap between brain and social behavior? The social brain is an 
organ of adaptation that builds its structure through interactions with others. Studies of 
functional specialization within the PFC have emphasized the distinction between lateral 
and medial PFC areas (Elliott et al., 2000; Gilbert et al., 2006a; Gilbert et al., 2006b). 
Because the medial PFC (mPFC) is phylogenetically and ontogenetically older than the 
lateral PFC, a functional dissociation evolved in which the mPFC became capable of 
encoding stable, internally focused, mental-oriented representations compared to 
adaptive, externally focused, control-oriented representations encoded in the lateral PFC 
(Barbey et al., 2009; Koechlin et al., 2000; Krueger et al., 2009a; Lieberman, 2007; 
Wood et al., 2005).  
The representation of social event knowledge provided humans with an 
instrument for interpreting and acting on a social reality that would otherwise be 
unpredictable. Over the course of evolution, precursors of social event knowledge began 
to serve specific goals to improve social interaction and intelligence by providing 
interpretive context for agents, actions, objects, and settings to be found in the social 
world. As a consequence, specialized neural systems in the mPFC emerged that enabled 
the encoding of social event knowledge that is intimately involved in both planning and 
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monitoring one’s own behavior as well as understanding and predicting the behavior of 
others.  
Most current theories of PFC function focus on lateral PFC subregions (Badre, 
2008; Botvinick, 2008; Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000; Duncan, 2001; Fuster, 2001; 
Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Ramnani and Owen, 2004), 
whereas a systematic analysis of mPFC subregions in the context of social functions only 
began recently (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2008). Although nonhuman 
primate research has not been particularly helpful in identifying higher-order social 
mPFC functions, however, accumulating evidence from functional neuroimaging studies 
in humans has demonstrated that besides the temporal pole, superior temporal sulcus, 
temporoparietal junction, and amygdala (Frith and Frith, 2006), subregions of the mPFC 
are also core regions of social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 
2008). Even though it is acknowledged that the mPFC mediates social event knowledge 
(Heberlein, 2008; Krueger and Grafman, 2008; Krueger et al., 2007b; Wood et al., 
2005), the underlying neural structures of social event knowledge and the nature of its 
functional subdivisions within the mPFC are still obscure. 
Some current cognitive neuroscience frameworks have direct implications for the 
understanding of the neural basis of social event knowledge, but each has its own 
limitations with respect to their relevance for social event knowledge (Damasio, 1996; 
Grafman, 1995; Moll et al., 2005). For example, although the somatic marker hypothesis 
has been influential and is considered to be a possible mechanism that could underlie the 
emergence of social event knowledge (Damasio, 1996), this framework does not 
explicitly address the role of different PFC subregions in mediating social event 
knowledge. Furthermore, the structured event complex framework supports claims that 
executive functions performed by the PFC are based on stored event sequence 
knowledge that have clear implications for social event knowledge (Grafman, 1995), but 
it does not predict how PFC regions interact with limbic areas and other cortical regions 
to give rise to a wide variety of social cognitive functions leading to goal-directed social 
behaviors. Finally, the event-feature-emotion complex framework explains how cultural 
and context-dependent knowledge, semantic social knowledge and motivational states 
can be integrated to explain complex aspects of moral cognition (Moll et al., 2005). 
However, moral cognition only accounts for some aspects of social event knowledge 




In this synopsis, I sketch out an integrative theory —entitled Structural and 
Temporal Representation Binding (STRing) theory— of the neural and cognitive basis of 
social event knowledge (Krueger et al., 2009a). I draw together the elements of the 
theory from four principal components: evolution, neuroanatomy, cognition, and 
behavior. This theory will necessarily be incomplete, but I hope to show that by drawing 
these components together into a single coherent framework, one might gain further 
knowledge of the underlying cognitive and neural representations involved in social 
event knowledge. First, I summarize the key elements of the evolution and biology of the 
human PFC. I argue that the STRing theory is consistent with what is known about the 
evolution, structure, connectivity, development, and neurophysiology of the PFC. 
Second, I describe the principles of the STRing theory. I argue that the mPFC represents 
event simulators (elators) that give rise to social event knowledge via structural and 
temporal representation binding with regions in the posterior cerebral cortex and 
subcortical brain structures. Finally, I review the different lines of evidence to support 
the STRing theory by focusing on neuroimaging studies. I argue that components of 
social event knowledge are of vital importance for the simulation of event schemata, 
person schemata, and self schemata that serve a wide variety of social cognitive 
functions leading to goal-directed social behaviors. 
 
1.1 Evolution and Biology of the Human Prefrontal Cortex 
Over millions of years, natural selection slowly shaped the human brain favoring neural 
circuits that were good at solving adaption problems of our ancestors. As the result, 
brains evolved and grew from back (the visual areas) to front (the so-called executive 
brain) creating brains with more complex abilities. Importantly, increases in brain 
volume across primates were driven largely by a disproportionate increase in frontal lobe 
volume that lead to evolutionary advances from primates to humans (Chiavaras et al., 
2001; Elston, 2000; Elston and Rosa, 2000) emerging to a more sophisticated internal 
and differentially organized neural PFC architecture (Chiavaras et al., 2001; Elston, 
2000; Elston and Rosa, 2000). For example, the human PFC (the frontal pole, 
Brodmann’s area 10, in particular) is proportionally larger to the rest of the cerebral 
cortex compared to the PFC of primates (Rilling and Insel, 1999; Semendeferi et al., 
2001; Semendeferi et al., 2002). Furthermore, neurons in the human PFC have the ability 
to sustain their firing and code the temporal and sequential properties of ongoing events 
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in the environment over longer periods of time (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000; 
Rueckert and Grafman, 1998). Moreover, pyramidal cells in the human PFC are 
significantly more spinous compared to other cortical areas, making them capable of 
handling a larger amount of excitatory inputs (Elston, 2000; Elston and Rosa, 2000). 
Finally, following general patterns of brain ontogeny (neurogenesis, early, dense synapse 
formation followed by synaptic pruning and myelination), the PFC undergoes relatively 
late postnatal development compared to other cortical association areas (Conel, 1939; 
Flechsig, 1920; Huttenlocher, 1990; Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997). It does not fully 
mature until adolescence and early adulthood leaving a great deal of neural plasticity to 
adjust to circumstances in the environment (Chugani et al., 1987; Diamond, 1991; 
Durston et al., 2001; Giedd et al., 1999; Paus et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999). Although 
many social cognitive abilities in humans first emerge during the period of peak synaptic 
density, many of our more complex social cognitive functions do not reach adult level of 
efficiency and competence until late adolescence or early adulthood, after the most 
pronounced phases of synaptic pruning have been completed (Blakemore, 2008). 
The human PFC occupies approximately one-third of the entire human cerebral 
cortex and has a columnar design like other cortical regions. Some regions of the human 
PFC have a total of 6 layers; other regions are agranular (without a granular cell layer). It 
can be subdivided into lateral, medial, and orbitofrontal regions (Fig. 1), in which 
Brodmann’s areas (BA, 8-11, 23-25, 32, 44-47) provide the cytoarchitectonic 
subdivision within each of these gross regions (Barbas, 2000; Brodmann, 1912; Stuss 
and Benson, 1986). In particular, the mPFC –consisting of medial orbital frontal cortex 
(mOFC), ventral mPFC (vmPFC), and dorsal mPFC (dmPFC)– has considerably 
increased in size in recent evolution in the brains of primates. Importantly, medial and 
lateral human PFC belong to two distinct cytoarchitectonic trends within the human PFC 
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1996). The medial trend is phylogenetically and ontogenetically 
older than the lateral trend, which is especially well developed in humans (Stuss and 
Benson, 1986). The PFC subregions are interconnected with other areas of the brain and 
almost all of these pathways are reciprocal (Alexander et al., 1990; Masterman and 
Cummings, 1997). In particular, the mPFC has strong limbic system connections via its 
medial and orbital efferent connections that terminate in the amygdala, thalamus, and 
parahippocompal regions (Groenewegen and Uylings, 2000; Price, 1999) and long 




Figure 1. Structure of the human prefrontal cortex. Adapted from Fuster (2001). 
 
In summary, the evolution and the biology of the human PFC are strongly 
suggestive of its role in the integration of sensory and memory information as well as in 
the representation and control of actions and behavior. Along with extended firing of 
neurons, specialized neural systems were developed that enabled the encoding of these 
social behaviors into sequentially linked, individually recognizable events. The event 
sequence itself must be parsed as each event begins, and ends, in order to explicitly 
recognize the nature, duration, and number of events that compose this sequence (Zacks 
et al., 2001; Zacks and Tversky, 2001). These event sequences, to be goal-oriented and 
cohere, must obey a structure that can be conceptualized as a representation (i.e., a 
‘permanent’ unit of memory that), when activated, corresponds to a dynamic brain state 
signified by the strength and pattern of neural activity in a local PFC sector. In this sense, 
over the course of evolution, specialized neural systems in the mPFC emerged hat 
enabled the encoding and retrieval of social event knowledge into abstract dynamic 
structured summary representations that can be used to guide social self- and other-
related goal-directed behavior over a longer period of time (Barbey et al., 2009; Huey et 
al., 2006; Rueckert and Grafman, 1998; Wood and Grafman, 2003). 
 
1.2 Principles and Predictions of the STRing Theory 
Because the design of the brain owes its functional organization to a natural, 
evolutionary process, an evolutionarily cognitive neuroscience approach for a theory of 
social event knowledge is a logical consequence. The STRing theory relies on the 
concept of abstract dynamic structured summary representations (Barsalou, 1999; 
Damasio, 1989), which have its roots in mechanisms that are grounded both in brain 
 7
INTRODUCTION 
architecture and in principles of neural processing (Barsalou, 2008b). According to this 
view, representations have no existence separate from processes, but are instead 
embedded in, distributed across, and hence, inseparable from one another (Barsalou et 
al., 2007). The STRing theory seeks to establish the format and domain specificity of 
representations according to which the same fundamental processes operate on different 
categories of information regarding social event knowledge. 
According to the STRing theory, the mPFC represents elators that give rise to 
social event knowledge via structural and temporal representation binding with regions 
in the posterior cerebral cortex and subcortical brain structures (Fig. 2). Elators are 
information-processing modules that were selected throughout the human’s evolutionary 
history, because they are economic, efficient, and reliable solutions in producing social 
behavior that solved particular adaptive social problems. In particular, elators capture the 
sequence of previously encountered social events that are semantically structured by 
distinctive features such as agents, actions, objects, and settings (Krueger, 2000). For 
example, the abstraction for ‘hosting a birthday party’ represents a sequence of events 
(e.g., the host invites guests to the birthday party, bakes a cake, lights the candles, 
presents the cake to the birthday boy, sings “happy birthday”) that involve agents (e.g., 
host and birthday boy), actions (e.g., baking a cake and lighting the candles), objects 
(e.g., birthday cake and candles), and background settings (e.g., dining room). 
Importantly, elators are temporally organized on the basis of (i) goals that enable the 
selection of goal-directed event sequences, and (ii) outcomes that enable the selection of 
the affective responses and reward values associated with goal achievement.  
Elators as abstract dynamic structured summary representations are learned and 
developed over time through direct and indirect perception and experience of social 
situations. Three central properties of elators exist, which together can be defined as a 
summary representation of a category of knowledge in long-term memory (Barsalou, 
2003): (1) Elators are closely linked to interpretation, i.e., once a concept for social 
event knowledge has been abstracted from experience, its summary representation 
supports the subsequent interpretation for later experiences. (2) Elators are organized into 
structured representations, i.e., they get rather assembled into structured representations 
that interpret complex structures than interpreting isolated components of social 
experiences in the world. (3) Elators are dynamic summary representations, i.e., instead 
of a single abstraction representing a social event knowledge category, an infinite 
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number of diverse abstractions can be constructed to represent a social event knowledge 
category temporally.  
Elators are encoded and retrieved on the basis of simulation mechanisms 
(Barsalou, 1999). It is now widely accepted that the human brain relies heavily on 
parallel processing. When a social situation is perceived or experienced, feature detectors 
in relevant modalities of the brain capture modality-specific states, and neurons in nearby 
association areas store the patterns’ features to represent aspects of this experience. For 
example, social perceptual features (e.g., face, voice, and body posture of the agent) are 
captured in the anterior and posterior temporal cortex, action features (e.g., socially-
centered action sequences) in the pre-motor cortex, and emotional features (e.g., 
happiness) in limbic structures. Association areas exist at multiple hierarchical levels 
ranging from posterior association areas to increasingly complex association areas in 
anterior brain regions (Duncan, 2001). Importantly, the mPFC —located at the apex of 
this hierarchy— binds simpler features from different modalities. In particular, PFC 
neurons conjoin patterns of these features across association areas and time, uniquely 
capturing the structured and temporally organized components of social event knowledge 
on the basis of goals and outcomes represented by the social situation.  
As multiple instances of the same social situation are perceived or experienced, 
they recruit similar neural states in modality-specific feature maps and activate similar 
association areas. As the consequence, neurons in the PFC capture diverse exemplars of 
social situations, establishing an elator that encompasses an abstract dynamic multi-
modal summary representation distributed throughout the brain’s association and 
modality-specific areas. Mere observation, recognizing, or thinking of a similar situation 
triggers the activation of a subset of neurons in the mPFC and partially reactivates elator 
components in the absence of bottom-up sensory stimulation so that inferences about the 
situation can be drawn via pattern completion with all components simulated (Barsalou 
et al., 2003). The reenactment of elator content arises through structural and temporal 
binding by oscillatory firing patterns of neurons with frequencies in the gamma-range 
(Engel and Singer, 2001) of distributed representations stored in spatially separate 




Figure 2. STRing theory. (a) Social event knowledge. The abstraction for ‘hosting a birthday 
party’ represents a sequence of events (e.g. the host invites guests to the birthday party, bakes a 
cake, lights the candles, presents the cake to the birthday boy, sings ‘happy birthday’) that 
involve agents (e.g. host and birthday boy), actions (e.g. baking a cake and lighting the candles), 
objects (e.g. birthday cake and candles), and background settings (e.g. dining room). (b) 
Structural and temporal representation binding. Capture: Feature detectors in relevant 
modalities of the brain capture modality-specific states, whereas nearby association areas store 
the patterns’ features to represent aspects of experience. The mPFC conjoins patterns of 
activation across association areas and time, capturing the semantically structured and temporally 
organized components of social event knowledge into an elator. Reenactment: Once an elator 
exists, it can reenact small subsets of its content as specific elations. The reenactment of elator 
content arises through structural and temporal representation binding that encompasses a multi-
modal representation distributed throughout the brain’s association and modality-specific areas. 
(c) Event simulator (elator). Elators are structured by events that are defined by distinctive 
features such as agents, actions, objects, and settings, and temporally organized on the basis of 
goals enabling the selection of goal-directed event sequences and event outcomes enabling the 
selection of the affective responses and reward values associated with goal achievement. Adapted 
from Krueger et al., (2009a). 
 
According to the STRing theory, elator functions are organized along a dorso-
ventral spatial gradient that maps directly onto the anatomical architecture of the mPFC 
(Barbas et al., 1999; Carmichael and Price, 1996; Ongur et al., 2003) (Fig. 3). The dorso-
ventral gradient is characterized by a continuum between elators mediating goal 
knowledge versus elators mediating outcome knowledge derived from social event 
knowledge. On the one hand, goal knowledge supports inferences about the likely 
actions performed by agents for goal achievement and preferentially recruits the dmPFC. 
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This goal pathway has reciprocal connections with brain regions that are associated with 
motor control (premotor cortex, and supplementary motor area), performance monitoring 
(cingulate cortex), and higher-order sensory processing (association areas, parietal 
cortex) (Ongur et al., 2003). On the other hand, outcome knowledge enables inferences 
about likely affective responses and reward values for agents accompanying goal 
achievement and preferentially recruits the vmPFC/mOFC. This outcome pathway has 
reciprocal connections with brain regions that are associated with emotional processing 
(amygdala), memory (hippocampus), reward processing (basal ganglia including the 
striatum and the nucleus accumbens) and higher-order sensory processing (temporal 
visual association areas) (Ongur et al., 2003). Importantly, as one moves more rostrally 
within the mPFC, progressively more complex elators are represented, which are 
hierarchically organized and guide social behavior over progressively longer temporal 
intervals. The hierarchical structure of elators maps directly onto the anatomical 
hierarchical architecture of the mPFC (Badre, 2008; Botvinick, 2008; Fuster, 1997). 
Since the most rostral part of the PFC (Brodmann’s area 10) is one of the last brain 
regions to mature (Giedd et al., 1999), it is ideally suited to represent more complex 
elators that integrate information from the goal pathway with information from the 
outcome pathway. 
 
Figure 3. Elator functions and spatial gradients in the mPFC. The mPFC consists of three 
sectors: mOFC (z<-15mm of the Talairach atlas), vmPFC (z<20mm), and dmPFC (z20mm). 
The goal knowledge pathway in the dmPFC supports inferences about the likely actions 
performed by agents for goal achievement. The outcome knowledge pathway in the 
vmPFC/mOFC enables inferences about the likely affective responses and reward values for 
agents accompanying goal achievement. Most rostral parts of the mPFC mediate more complex 
elators that allow integration of information from the goal pathway with information from the 




1.3 Neuroscience Evidence in Support of the STRing Theory 
Once elators have been abstracted from experience with daily life situations, their 
abstract dynamic structured summary representations support the interpretation of future 
behaviors. Components of social event knowledge can be reenacted temporally as 
simulations and tailored to the constraints of the current social situation serving a wide 
variety of social cognitive functions. The STRing theory predicts that different 
components of social event knowledge are of vital importance for the simulation of event 
schemata, person schemata, and self schemata. Importantly, those schemata are both 
overlapping and distinct cognitive concepts (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Taylor and 
Crocker, 1981) allowing to integrate information over time into a more general and 
abstract notion of social conduct such as categorizing social entities and events, drawing 
social inferences, and planning and remembering social interactions (Barresi and Moore, 
1996; Barsalou, 2008a). They can be seen as shared representations that have the 
capacity to coordinate first-person and third-person information via a single conceptual 
system. Therefore, the interaction of these schemata allows for a direct, experiential first-
person understanding of third-person behavior (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). 
Understanding our own behavior allows us to relate to and understand the behavior of 
others, which opens up possibilities for more sophisticated social behavior. 
 
Event Schemata. Event schemata describe the sequential and hierarchical organization 
of events derived from everyday activities (Nelson and Gruendel, 1981; Schank and 
Abelson, 1977). The STRing theory predicts that the sequential knowledge component of 
social event knowledge is of crucial importance for event schemata: elators represented 
in the mPFC simulate event schemata that organize and guide the sequential and 
hierarchical organization of events in daily life activities. To test this hypothesis, three 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments were performed to 
investigate the underlying neural structure of event schemata by focusing on the 
sequential knowledge component of social event knowledge: 
 
Experiment 1. The first fMRI study investigated the patterns of brain responses when 
participants were engaged in judgments about the sequential organization of low 
frequency (e.g., going to a funeral), moderate frequency (e.g., going bowling), and high 
frequency (e.g., going out for dinner) daily life activities based on normative data 
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(Krueger et al., 2007b). After presenting the activity (e.g., going out for dinner) and a 
pair of events (e.g. look at menu–order dinner), participants were asked to judge whether 
the pair was correctly ordered. The results showed that subregions of the mPFC (BA 10) 
were differentially engaged in mediating daily life activities depending on how often 
those were reportedly performed in daily life (Fig. 4a), confirming recent evidence that 
the mPFC is involved in mediating event sequence knowledge (Crozier et al., 1999; 
Knutson et al., 2004; Kuchinke et al., 2009; Partiot et al., 1996; Ruby et al., 2002). 
Importantly, the posterior medial part of BA 10 was activated for high frequency 
activities, whereas the anterior medial part of BA 10 was activated for low-frequency 
activities. Interestingly, each of the frequency-dependent mPFC regions falls onto one of 
the three architectonic subdivisions of the human BA 10 (Ongur et al., 2003) (Fig. 4b). 
These subregions have a similar cellular pattern, but vary in the degree of granularity and 
the development of cortical layer III (and layer IV), with the most prominent and well-
developed layer III located in the polar area (10p), which is not observed in non-human 
primates (Creutzfeldt, 1995). This increase in cytoarchitectonic complexity along the 
rostro-caudal axis of the mPFC towards the frontopolar cortex might be an indication of 
the underlying frequency-dependent representation of event schemata encoded in each of 
the medial FC subregions. In conclusion, the evidence supports the assumption that the 
mPFC mediates event schemata that organize and guide the sequence for planning and 
performance of daily life activities. Being able to represent those schemata confer 
humans with a great advantage in carrying out plans, controlling a course of actions, or 
organizing everyday life routines.  
 
Figure 4. Brain responses for daily life activities along the rostro-caudal mPFC axis. (a) The posterior 
mPFC (post MPFC) was activated for high frequency activities, the middle mPFC (mid MPFC) for 
moderate frequency activities, and the anterior mPFC (ant MPFC) for low frequency activities. Adapted 
from Krueger et al., (2007b). (b) Location of cytoarchitectonic BA 10 surface-rendered onto medial 




Experiment 2. The second fMRI study investigated the patterns of brain responses when 
participants were engaged in evaluating the complexity (i.e., number of events) of daily 
life activities selected on the basis of normative data (Krueger et al., 2009c). Participants 
were asked to rate daily life activity in terms of the number of events involved in the 
activity either consisting of few events (e.g., ‘stirring a cup of coffee’) or many events 
(e.g., ‘planning a wedding’). The results revealed a left frontoparietal circuit expanding 
from the premotor cortex to the medial frontopolar cortex (posterior inferior parietal 
lobule, BA 39; premotor cortex, BA 6; dmPFC, BA 8; and medial FPC, BA 10) (Fig. 
5a). As the left hemisphere is more adept at constructing determinate, precise, and 
unambiguous representations of the world (Beeman et al., 2000; Goel et al., 2007), it is 
designed to mediate the primary meaning of within-event information, sequential 
dependencies between single adjacent events, and coding of boundaries between events 
(Krueger and Grafman, 2008). Importantly, within the frontoparietal circuit the FPC (BA 
10) was isolated as the only region that showed increased activation for more complex 
daily life activities (Fig. 5b). The FPC is ideally suited for representing more complex 
event schemata, because it is the single largest cytoarchitectonic area of the PFC 
(Ramnani and Owen, 2004) and among one of the last brain regions to mature (Diamond, 
1991; Durston et al., 2001; Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999). In conclusion, the 
evidence supports the assumptions that the mFPC mediates event schemata that organize 
and guide the sequence for planning and performance of daily life activities. As one 
moves more rostrally within the mPFC, progressively more complex elators are 
represented that guide behavior over progressively longer temporal intervals. This type 
of knowledge provides the underlying cognitive structure for the human ability to build 
and execute complex behaviors ranging from carrying out simple plans to organizing 
complex daily life routines. 
 
Figure 5. Brain responses for daily life complexity. (a) A left frontoparietal network (mPFC, BA 10; 
dmPFC, BA 8; premotor cortex, BA 6; and posterior inferior parietal lobule, BA 39) was activated by the 
complexity judgment task. (b) Activation in the frontopolar cortex increased for more complex daily life 
activities. Adapted from Krueger et al., (2009c). 
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Experiment 3. The final study combined functional and structural MRI to investigate the 
patterns of brain responses during imagination of daily life activities containing physical 
aggression and determined the cortical thickness in healthy male adolescents (Strenziok 
et al., 2009). Participants where asked to imagine their own aggressive behaviors during 
social interactions that were initiated by a fictitious male teenager that they incidentally 
met in a parking garage. The results revealed a co-localization of age-dependent 
activation changes and cortical thinning in the FPC, reflecting ongoing maturation of the 
FPC during adolescence towards a refinement of social information processing 
(Blakemore, 2008). Moreover, the results revealed reduced vmPFC activation while 
participants were mentally engaged in aggressive behavior to the extent to which 
adolescents experienced anger in everyday life (Fig. 6). Recent findings in adult patients 
with brain damage (Anderson et al., 1999; Blair and Cipolotti, 2000; Damasio et al., 
1994; Grafman et al., 1996), aggressive populations (Koenigsberg et al., 2005; Soloff et 
al., 2000) and healthy adults (Pietrini et al., 2000) support this finding indicating that the 
vmPFC is critically involved in the control of aggressive behavior. Typically, the vmPFC 
modulates aggressive behaviors by exerting inhibitory control over aggressive impulses, 
however, this inhibitory control has to be loosened (associated with a dampening of 
vmPFC activation) to engage in imagined aggressive behavior. In conclusion, the 
evidence supports the assumptions that the mPFC mediates event schemata that organize 
and guide the sequence for performance of imagined aggressive behavior. Furthermore, 
the co-localization of age-dependent activation changes and cortical thinning indicates an 
ongoing maturation of the FPC during adolescence towards a refinement of social 
information processing that can potentially facilitate mature social behavior in aggressive 
contexts. 
 
Figure 6. Brain responses during imagined aggression. The vmPFC showed reduced activation while 
participants were engaged in imagining aggressive behavior to the extent to which adolescent males 
experienced anger in everyday life. Adapted from Strenziok et al. (2009). 
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In summary, the evidence supports the prediction that the sequential knowledge 
component of social event knowledge is of crucial importance for event schemata. In 
particular, elators represented in the mPFC simulate event schemata that organize and 
guide the sequence for planning and performance of daily life routines. This evidence is 
further supported by clinical observations that damage to the mPFC leads to an inability 
to produce goal-directed behavior such as carrying out plans, controlling a course of 
actions, or organizing everyday life routines (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985; Janowsky et 
al., 1989; Shallice, 1982; Shallice and Burgess, 1991; Sirigu et al., 1996; Sirigu et al., 
1995; Stuss and Benson, 1984). Finally, there exists further confirming evidence from a 
recent quantitative neuroimaging meta-analysis (Van Overwalle, 2008) showing that a 
broad range of social tasks such as social judgment about (i) event knowledge, (ii) 
morality, (iii) social scripts, and (iv) theory of mind beliefs elicit activations in the mPFC 
(Fig. 7). Importantly, based on the STRing theory, these different task activation patterns 
can be parsimoniously explained by reenactment of different components contained in 
social event knowledge: the action tasks draw on goals or end-states of agents or actions; 
the morality tasks on just or unjust actions of agents; the social script tasks on the 
sequence of events; and the theory of mind beliefs tasks on intentions and desires of 
agents. Moreover, the STRing theory predicts a segregation of elator functions along the 
dorso-ventral mPFC axis: goal knowledge mediated by the dmPFC pathway supports 
inferences about person schemata, whereas outcome knowledge mediated by the 
vmPFC/OFC pathway supports inferences about self schemata. 
 
Figure 7. Neuroscience evidence in support for event schemata. Functional neuroimaging 
meta-analysis results are displayed for social judgment tasks about actions, morality, social 
scripts, and theory of mind (ToM) beliefs. Tasks reenacted elator components contained within 
event schemata and elicited activation in the mPFC. Adapted from van Overwalle (2008) and 




Person Schemata. Person schemata describe conceptual structures of personality traits 
that enable a person to categorize and make inferences from the experiences of 
interactions with other people, and to anticipate the nature of interactions with 
individuals by providing control and predictability in social interactions (Cantor and 
Mischel, 1979). The STRing theory predicts that the goal knowledge component of 
social event knowledge is of crucial importance for person schemata: elators simulating 
person schemata preferentially recruit the dmPFC and reenactment of the goal pathway 
enables an agent to make inferences about the likely goals of other agents for goal 
achievement in social situations. To test this hypothesis, three neuroimaging experiments 
were performed to investigate the underlying neural structure of person schemata by 
focusing on the goal knowledge component of social event knowledge. 
 
Experiment 1. The first fMRI study investigated the patterns of brain responses for 
conditional and unconditional trust during social exchange (Krueger et al., 2007a). Two 
strangers interacted with one another in a sequential multiround reciprocal trust game to 
make decisions for monetary payoffs. The results revealed that the dmPFC is critically 
involved in building a trust relationship by inferring another person's goals, determining 
whether to trust a person in the future (Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001; 
Rilling et al., 2004) (Fig. 8a). Importantly, the result suggest that the dmPFC can be 
differently engaged to recruit more primitive neural systems in maintaining conditional 
and unconditional trust in a partnership (Fig. 8b). By adopting a conditional trust 
strategy, the defector group (in which partners experienced some defections during the 
experiment) showed a significant increase in dmPFC activation over the experiment and 
selectively activated the ventral tegmental area (VTA), a region linked to the 
dopaminergic mesolimbic reward system providing a general reinforcement mechanism 
to encode expected and realized reward (Andreasen et al., 1994; Fiorillo et al., 2003). In 
contrast, by adopting an unconditional trust strategy, the non-defector group (in which 
neither player ever defected on their partners’ decision to trust) showed a significant 
decrease in dmPFC activation over the experiment and selectively activated the septal 
area (SA), a limbic brain region linked to modulate various aspects of social behavior 
including pair bonding, social recognition, and social attachment (Aron et al., 2005; Moll 
et al., 2006; Numan, 2000). In conclusion, the evidence supports the assumptions that the 
dmPFC mediates person schemata that enable an agent to make inferences about the 
likely goals of other agents during social interactions. As one of the distinguishing 
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features of the human species, this more recently evolved dmPFC region can be 
differently engaged via structural and temporal representation binding through the goal 
pathway with more primitive neural systems in maintaining conditional (VTA) and 
unconditional trust (SA) in a partnership. 
 
Figure 8. Brain responses for interpersonal trust. (a) Decisions to trust activated the dmPFC (BA 9/32). 
The non-defector group showed a decrease in dmPFC activation, whereas the defector group showed an 
increase in dmPFC activation across stages. (b) Different engagement of the dmPFC allowed recruiting of 
more primitive neural systems in maintaining unconditional (SA) and conditional (VTA) trust in a 
partnership. Adapted from Krueger et al., (2007a). 
 
Experiment 2. The second fMRI study investigated the different patterns of brain 
responses for trusting versus reciprocating behavior during social exchange (Krueger et 
al., 2008). Two strangers interacted with one another in a sequential multiround 
reciprocal trust game while they were asked to make decisions for monetary payoffs. The 
results revealed that the dmPFC and anterior insula (AI) were commonly recruited for 
decisions to trust and reciprocate (Fig. 9a). The dmPFC plays a critical role in 
representing another person’s psychological perspective allowing partners to predict the 
behavior of others by determining whether to trust their partners and whether their 
partners will reciprocate their trust in the future (Amodio and Frith, 2006). The AI region 
has been associated with empathy, which plays both an epistemological role to provide 
information about the future actions of other individuals and a social role to serve as the 
origin of the motivation for cooperative and pro-social behavior (de Vignemont and 
Singer, 2006). Importantly, the results further demonstrated that the FPC and the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) were specifically recruited for decisions to trust (Fig. 9b). 
The right TPJ is engaged in perspective taking helping to distinguish between self- and 
other-related behavior (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008), whereas the FPC 
encodes meta-cognitive representations that enable humans to reflect on long-term goals 
(Tanaka et al., 2004; Wood and Grafman, 2003). In conclusion, the evidence supports 
the assumption that dmPFC mediates person schemata that enable an agent to make 
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inferences about the likely goals of other agents and to anticipate long-term goals and 
outcomes of future interactions with other agents. Trusting and reciprocating behavior 
draws upon recently evolved neural systems via structural and temporal representation 
binding through the goal pathway with regions in the posterior cerebral cortex (e.g., TPJ) 
and subcortical brain structures (AI) supporting reciprocal exchange and producing 
mutual advantage that operates beyond the immediate spheres of kinship. 
  
Figure 9. Brain responses for trust and reciprocity. (a) The dmPFC (BA 9/32) and the AI (BA 13) were 
monly activated for trusting and reciprocating behavior. (b) Decisions to trust specicom
b
fically activated the 
ilateral FPC (BA 10) and right TPJ (BA 40). Adapted from Krueger et al., (2008). 
 
Experiment 3. The final fMRI study investigated the underlying neural structure of social 
concepts such as ‘tactless’ or ‘honorable’, which allow us to describe other agents' social 
behaviors (Zahn et al., 2007). Participants were asked to make judgments about the 
meaning relatedness of word pairs of social concepts (e.g., honor–brave). The results 
showed that judgment of social concepts activated the dmPFC (BA 10/32) (Fig. 10a), 
and activation in the anterior temporal pole (aTP, BA 38) was correlated with the 
richness of detail with which social concepts describe social behavior (Fig. 10b). The 
results agree with the central role for the dmPFC for inferring another person's intentions 
to predicting social behaviors (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Gusnard et al., 2001) and for the 
aTP for representing conceptual knowledge (Davies et al., 2005; Garrard and Carroll, 
2006; McClelland and Rogers, 2003). Although previous studies have shown 
subdivisions for different semantic domains (e.g., tools, animals, and faces) in modality-
specific posterior temporal regions (Chao et al., 1999; Ishai et al., 1999), this study 
demonstrated that specialized subregions for different social conceptual domains also 
exist within the aTP. In conclusion, the evidence supports the assumptions that the 
dmPFC mediates person schemata that enable an agent to make inferences about the 
likely goals of other agents. As a unique feature of humans, the dmPFC (representing 
social event knowledge) interacts with the aTP (representing social concept knowledge) 
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via structural and temporal representation binding through the goal pathway to enable the 
description of another person’s social behavior. 
 
Figure 10. Brain responses for social concepts. (a) Judgment of social concepts revealed activation in the 
dmPFC (BA 10/32). (b) The right aTP (BA 38) was correlated with the richness of detail with which social 
concepts describe social behavior. Adapted from Zahn et al., (2007). 
In summary, the evidence confirms that the goal knowledge component of social 
event knowledge is of crucial importance for person schemata. Elators simulating person 
schemata preferentially recruited the dmPFC and reenactment of the goal pathway 
enabled an agent to make inferences about the likely goals of other agents in social 
situations. This evidence is further supported by a recent quantitative neuroimaging 
meta-analysis (Van Overwalle, 2008) (Fig. 11). The results showed that inferences about 
the person schemata —individuals made judgments about goal knowledge that enables 
an inference about the goal-directed actions of others derived from behavior in short 
stories, sentences, and single words, or interactive neuroeconomic games— 
preferentially activated the dmPFC. In addition, there exist confirming evidence that 
damage to the dmPFC leads to an inability to infer about goal-directed behaviors of 
others during social exchange (Kain and Perner, 2003; Manes et al., 2002; Stuss et al., 
2001).  
 
Figure 11. Neuroscience Evidence in Support for Person and Self Schemata. Functional neuroimaging 
meta-analysis results are displayed for tasks that reenact elator components contained within person and 
self schemata. Goal knowledge supports inferences about person schemata and preferentially recruits the 
dmPFC. Outcome knowledge enables inferences about self schemata and preferentially recruits the 
vmPFC. Adapted from van Overwalle (2008) and Krueger et al., (2009a); Talairach space: y-axis indicates 
anterior-posterior and z-axis inferior-superior lines. 
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Self schemata. Self schemata refer to cognitive generalizations about the self derived 
from past experience that organize and guide the processing of self-related information 
contained in the individual’s social experience (Markus, 1977). The STRing theory 
predicts that the outcome knowledge component of social event knowledge is of crucial 
importance for self schemata: elators simulating self schemata preferentially recruit the 
vmPFC and reenactment of the outcome pathway enables inferences about the likely 
affective responses and reward values accompanying self-related information processing. 
To test this hypothesis, three neuroimaging experiments were performed to investigate 
the underlying neural structure of self schemata by focusing on the outcome knowledge 
component of social event knowledge. 
 
Experiment 1. The first study combined multidimensional scaling (MDS) and parametric 
fMRI to investigate how the underlying psychological architecture of political beliefs is 
structured and where the multidimensional structure of political beliefs is represented in 
the brain (Zamboni et al., 2009). Participants were asked to judge whether they agree or 
disagree with short political statements (e.g., The government should invest more in 
welfare.). The results revealed three independent dimensions of political beliefs: 
individualism, conservatism, and radicalism (Fig. 12a). Each dimension was reflected in 
a distinctive pattern of neural activations: (i) individualism (vmPFC, dmPFC, TPJ), (ii) 
conservatism (dlPFC), and (iii) radicalism (ventral striatum and precuneus), known to be 
involved in self-other processing (Mitchell et al., 2006), social decision-making in 
ambivalent situations (Kaplan et al., 2007; Knutson et al., 2006), and reward prediction 
(Rilling et al., 2002; Schultz et al., 1998), respectively. For the individualism (self vs. 
other) dimension, the TPJ plays a key role in perspective taking helping to distinguish 
between self- and other-related behavior (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Decety and 
Sommerville, 2003) (Fig. 12b). Importantly, more individual-centered political 
statements (e.g., Everybody should prioritize his or here own interest over society’s.) 
were associated with greater vmPFC activity due to more self-referential social 
processing (Mitchell et al., 2006; Northoff et al., 2006). In contrast, more society-
centered statements (e.g., Citizen should vote based on collective interest.) were 
associated with greater dmPFC activity due to more others-related social processing 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006). In conclusion, the evidence supports the 
assumptions that the vmPFC mediates self schemata via reenactment of the outcome 
pathway that organize and guide the processing of self-related information reflected in 
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political beliefs. As a fundamental human aspect, multidimensional political belief 
systems evolved from more basic social processes through which individuals interact to 
reach consensus in society. 
 
Figure 12. Structure and neural correlates of political beliefs. (a) The MDS analysis revealed a three-
dimensional spatial distribution for which each political statement can be described by three coordinates (x 
= conservatism, y = individualism, z = radicalism). (b) For the individualism dimension, the dmPFC and 
TPJ were increasingly activated by more society-related statements (shown in blue), whereas the vmPFC 
was increasingly activated by more individual-related statements (shown in red). Adapted from Zamboni et 
al., (2009). 
 
Experiment 2. The second fMRI study investigated the patterns of brain responses for 
charitable donation as an outstanding example of human altruism (Moll et al., 2006). 
Participants chose to endorse or oppose societal causes by anonymous decisions to 
donate or refrain from donating to real charitable organizations lined to a wide range of 
societal causes (e.g., abortion, death penalty, euthanasia). The results revealed, 
compatible with the ‘warm glow’ (joy of giving) effect (Andreoni, 1990), that donating 
to societal causes as well as earning money share the same neural systems of reward 
reinforcement and expectancy (ventral tegmental area, VTA; dorsal and ventral striatum, 
STR) (O'Doherty et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 1997), (Fig. 13a). The subgenual (SG) and 
lateral OFC (lOFC) areas were activated for decisions to donate or to oppose societal 
causes, playing key roles in more primitive mechanisms of social attachment (Bartels 
and Zeki, 2004; Young and Wang, 2004) and aversion (Blair et al., 1999; Kringelbach, 
2005), respectively (Fig. 13b). Importantly, the anterior part of the vmPFC (aPFC) was 
recruited when altruistic choices prevail over selfish material interests to the extent to 
which individuals were engaged in real-life voluntary charitable activities (Fig. 13c). The 
results are in agreement with the central role of the aPFC in altruistic punishment (de 
Quervain et al., 2004), prediction of future rewards (Rilling et al., 2002; Schultz et al., 
1997), and moral appraisals (Moll et al., 2002; Singer et al., 2004). In conclusion, the 
evidence supports the assumptions that the vmPFC mediates self schemata that organize 
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and guide the processing of self-related information reflected in altruistic behavior via 
the outcome pathway with general mammalian neural systems of reward, social 
attachment, and aversion. As a consequence, human altruism is able far to exceed the 
immediate bonds of kinship, even when no material or reputation gains are anticipated. 
 
Figure 13. Brain responses for monetary reward and donation. (a) The mesolimbic–striatal reward 
system (VTA, STR) was activated for both pure monetary reward and non-costly donation. (b) Decisions 
to donate or to oppose societal cause activated SG and lOFC areas, respectively. (c) The aPFC was 
distinctively activated when altruistic choices prevail over selfish material interests. Activation of aPFC 
was correlated with self-reported ratings of engagement in real-life voluntary charitable activities. Adapted 
from Moll et al., (2006). 
 
Experiment 3. The final study investigated the underlying neural structure of emotional 
intelligence in a sample of combat veterans from the Vietnam Head Injury Study, which 
is a prospective, long-term follow-up study of veterans with focal penetrating head 
injuries. Veterans were divided into vmPFC and dlPFC lesion (experimental) groups and 
a non-head-injured group (control, NC) based upon the presence or absence of local 
penetrating head injuries due to low velocity shrapnel wounds. The Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test was administered to examine strategic emotional 
intelligence (i.e., competency to understand emotional information and to apply it for the 
management of the self) and experiential (i.e., competency to perceive emotional 
information and to apply it for the integration into thinking) emotional intelligence 
(Mayer et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2003). The results revealed vmPFC damage diminished 
strategic emotional intelligence and hinders the understanding of emotional information 
to apply it for the management of the self, whereas dlPFC damage diminished 
experiential emotional intelligence and hinders the perception of emotional information 
(Fig. 14). Importantly, since the vmPFC is interconnected with limbic structures critical 
for long-term memory and the processing of internal states (affect and motivation) 
(Barbas and De Olmos, 1990; Porrino et al., 1981), it is well suited for processing 
knowledge that is crucial for understanding and managing emotionally relevant 
information of the self (Bar-On et al., 2003; Damasio, 1996). Convergent evidence has 
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shown that vmPFC damage leads to problems in interpersonal interactions and abnormal 
changes in personality (Beer et al., 2003; Eslinger and Damasio, 1985) as well as 
diminished capacities to respond to emotional values attributed to rewards and 
punishment (Bechara et al., 1997; Kringelbach, 2005). In conclusion, the evidence 
supports the assumptions that the vmPFC mediates self schemata via reenactment of the 
outcome pathway that organize and guide the processing of self-related information 
reflected in emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence should be viewed as 
complementary to cognitive intelligence and, when considered together, will provide a 
more complete understanding of human social behavior. 
 
Figure 14. Neural substrates of emotional intelligence. Coronal views are shown for the vmPFC (left) 
and dlPFC (right) group lesion overlaps. The color indicates the number of individuals with damage to a 
given voxel. The experiential and strategic emotional intelligence scores of the dlPFC and vmPFC groups 
were normalized (z-transformation) in comparison to the performances of the NC group. The results 
indicate a double dissociation in patient’s EI performances. Adapted from Krueger et al., (2009b). 
 
In summary, the evidence confirms that the outcome knowledge component of 
social event knowledge is of crucial importance for self schemata. Elators simulating self 
schemata preferentially recruited the vmPFC and reenactment of the outcome pathway 
enabled inferences about the likely affective responses and reward values accompanying 
self-related information processing. Beside the provided evidence the proposed 
segregation of elator functions is further supported by a recent quantitative neuroimaging 
meta-analysis (Van Overwalle, 2008) (Fig. 11). The results showed inferences about the 
self schemata —individuals made judgments about event outcomes that enable an 
inference about the affective states and rewards associated with goal achievement in 
retrospective to one-self or close others (e.g., mother and friends) in the form of ratings 
and descriptions, memories about the self, and thinking about one’s hopes— 
preferentially activated the vmPFC/mOFC. Finally, confirming evidence exist that 
damage to the vmPFC/mOFC leads to an inability to develop a coherent model of one’s
 24
INTRODUCTION 
own self with subsequent emotional lability (Damasio, 1999; Schore, 2003) and to severe 
impairment of social behavior such as social inappropriateness, lack of insight and 
initiative, poor judgment, and inappropriate affect (Anderson et al., 1999; Barrash et al., 
2000; Eslinger et al., 1992; Masterman and Cummings, 1997). Note that it is not by 
chance that affect and reward are regarded as key components for self schemata. 
Anatomically, the ‘core self’ has been associated with the vmPFC/mOFC (Decety and 
Sommerville, 2003; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004), because affect and reward are crucial 
to efficiently guide an individual’s decision-making during social conduct (Rolls, 1999; 
Tremblay and Schultz, 2000).  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
Based on the evolution and biology of the human PFC, I developed an integrative theory 
of the cognitive and neural basis of social event knowledge. The STRing theory assumes 
that the human mPFC represents elators that encompass a multi-modal representation of 
social event knowledge distributed throughout the brain’s association and modality-
specific areas. Once an elator exists, it can reenact small subsets of its content as specific 
elations. Elators as abstract dynamic structured summary representations provide the 
underlying properties for social cognitive structures such as event schemata, person 
schemata, and self schemata that are intimately involved in planning and monitoring 
one’s own behavior as well as understanding and predicting the behavior of others. 
Elators can be seen as shared representations that have the capacity to coordinate first-
person and third-person information via a single conceptual system, which allows us to 
understand other’s behavior by virtue of understanding our own behavior. 
Consistent with neuroscience evidence, I proposed a segregation of elator 
functions along the dorso-ventral mPFC axis: goal knowledge mediated by the dmPFC 
pathway supports inferences about the likely actions performed by agents for goal 
achievement, whereas outcome knowledge mediated by the vmPFC/mOFC pathway 
supports inferences about the likely affective responses and reward value accompanying 
goal achievement. Most rostral parts of the mPFC mediate more complex organized 
elators that allow integration over progressively longer temporal intervals of information 
from the goal pathway with information from the outcome pathway. The STRing theory 
generates testable hypotheses, anatomically and functionally specifies the nature of the 




example, what is the role of subcomponents of social event knowledge within the left 
and right hemispheres of the brain, given that the left PFC is more adept at constructing 
determinate, precise, and unambiguous representations of the world, whereas the right 
PFC is more adept at constructing and maintaining fluid, indeterminate, vague, and 
ambiguous representations of the world (Beeman et al., 2000; Goel et al., 2007)? 
Moreover, what underlying brain mechanisms for the proposed social functions are 
involved when individuals have not established relevant dynamic structured summary 
representations such as in the case of social brain disorders (e.g., autistic spectrum 
disorders)? From my perspective, studying the nature of dynamic structured summary 
representations is a fruitful way to characterize and identify the neural basis that 
underlies uniquely human social cognitive abilities, through patient studies and 
neuroimaging. Defining social functions that can be reconciled with the brain’s 
anatomical and physiological properties can bring us one step closer to an understanding 
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